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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of promissory estoppel was first recognized in section
90 of the original Restatement of Contracts.' Entitled "Promise Rea-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LA-W REVIEw.
David K, Lucas, J.D. expected, May 2001, University of Nebraska College of Law
(NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive Editor, 2000). I would like to thank my beau-
tiful fiancee, Lena Winner, for reading several drafts of this article after it was
accepted for publication. Only true love could compel a person to read an article
on promissory estoppel more than once!
1. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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sonably Inducing Definite and Substantial Action,"2 section 90 repre-
sented the first "out of the closet" apperception of the common law's
propensity to protect a promisee's detrimental reliance by enforcing
contracts that did not entirely comport with traditional contract prin-
ciples.3 Little did the drafters know, however, that section 90, origi-
nally intended as a defensive tool used to prevent a party from
avoiding liability for a promise, would become what some commenta-
tors believe to be a separate and distinct theory of recovery.4
Nowhere is the debate over the appropriate role of promissory es-
toppel more prevalent than in the at-will employment context. The
employment at-will doctrine, first articulated by Horace G. Wood in
his employment law treatise, 5 promotes the concept that employees,
in the absence of a contract for employment for a fixed and definite
period, may be terminated at any time by the will of either party.6
Upon that premise, it is difficult to argue that an employee may rea-
sonably rely upon an offer of at-will employment and, if such an offer
is terminated before, during, or after the employment relationship has
begun, invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel for recovery. Never-
theless, that is exactly what a number of courts have held.7
Recently, in Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C.,8
the Nebraska Supreme Court joined the group of jurisdictions that
recognize that a prospective at-will employee may avail him or herself
of the doctrine of promissory estoppel when seeking to recover against
2. Id.
3. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1197 (1998)(discussing Corbin's belief that the new principle
of promissory estoppel had strong case-law foundations).
4. See Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Es-
toppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGRS L. REV. 472, 481-87
(1983).
5. H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
6. See id. § 134, at 272.
7. See Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); see also
Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8"' Cir. 1988)(stating that an
employer who withdraws a promise of at-will employment prior to the start of the
employee's job fails to keep his or her promise in any material respect); Sheppard
v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1990)(stating that an employee can
expect to not be fired before he or she has had a chance to demonstrate his or her
ability to satisfy the requirements of the job); Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 658
P.2d 883 (Haw. 1983)(relying on section 90 to conclude that promissory estoppel
could be applied in the case of a promise of at-will employment); Gorham v. Ben-
son Optical, 539 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)(stating that an at-will em-
ployee may not be fired unless he or she has had a good-faith opportunity to
perform his or her duties); Rognlien v. Carter, 443 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989)(relying on reasoning similar to that of Gorham); Peck v. Imedia, Inc., 679
A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)(recognizing that there may be losses
incident to reliance upon a job offer itself, even though the employer can termi-
nate the relationship at any time).
8. 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999).
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an employer who has terminated his or her employment agreement.
Accordingly, this Note first details the factual background of the Goff-
Hamel case, then reviews the opinions, both pro and con, of those
courts that have faced the dilemma of applying promissory estoppel in
the at-will employment context. Next, the Note turns toward (1) an
analysis of the reasonableness of relying on an offer of at-will employ-
ment, and (2) a discussion of the propriety of reading "good faith" and
"fair dealing" exceptions into the at-will doctrine.
This Note concludes that, while it may have been appropriate to
use promissory estoppel as the basis for Goff-Hamel's recovery, the
court should not have invoked the doctrine to protect her reliance in-
terest-for it is unreasonable to rely upon an employment relation-
ship that may be terminated at any time. Nevertheless, the court may
have properly used promissory estoppel in furtherance of one of the
alternative theories for its use-i.e. to promote economic activity,9
identify enforcement-worthy promises,1O or compensate for damage to
one's expectation interests.i" As such, this Note examines these alter-
native theories and concludes that each would represent a more viable
theory of recovery for Goff-Hamel. Consequently, in similar cases the
Nebraska Supreme Court should consider expressly adopting one or
all of these alternative theories and, in so doing, provide structure and
logical guidance to future promissory estoppel litigants in the State of
Nebraska.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The day before Julie Goff-Hamel was to report to work at her new
job at Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C. [hereinafter "Obstetri-
cians"] she was fired. Apparently, the wife of one of Obstetricians' co-
owners opposed her employment. Instead of simply leaving, Goff-
Hamel filed suit in a Nebraska District Court seeking damages under
both contract law and promissory estoppel theories of recovery.' 2
9. See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Con-
tract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 945 (1985)
[hereinafter Farber & Matheson] (concluding that the promotion of trust in em-
ployment relationships is of ultimate importance and that "promises made in fur-
therance of economic activities be enforced without regard to the presence of
consideration or reliance").
10. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under
the Guise of Promissoy Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L.
REv. 895 (1987)(explaining that promissory estoppel should be used as a subsidi-
ary means of identifying bargains deserving of enforcement).
11. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111 (1991) (concluding that expectation remedies, not reliance remedies, are
routinely awarded in promissory estoppel cases).
12. See Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d
798 (1999).
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The trial court concluded that Goff-Hamel had relied on Obstetri-
cians' offer in resigning from her previous employment of eleven
years. However, the court ultimately opined that her dismissal was
lawful under Nebraska's at-will employment doctrine since Goff-
Hamel's employment agreement with Obstetricians did not specify
that she be employed for any specific length of time (i.e., her employ-
ment contract lacked a "specific term"). 13 As such, the lower court
concluded that promissory estoppel was of little help on the facts of
the case, since permitting recovery under that doctrine would create
an anomalous result whereby at-will employees could recover if they
were fired the day before work began, but not the day after. 14 Conse-
quently, Obstetricians was awarded judgment as a matter of law on
both counts.i5
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so took much
of the sting out of Nebraska's at-will employment doctrine.16 Previ-
ously, it had been "consistently held that when employment is not for
a definite term and there are no contractual, statutory, or constitu-
tional restrictions upon the right of discharge, an employer may law-
fully discharge an employee whenever and for whatever cause it
chooses."' 7 Nevertheless, in what can only be considered a new excep-
tion to Nebraska's at-will employment law, Nebraska's highest court
held that "promissory estoppel can be asserted in connection with the
offer of at-will employment and that the trial court erred in granting
Obstetricians summary judgment."1s Moreover, based on its new
promissory estoppel theory, the court found the facts of the case suffi-
cient to grant summary judgment in favor of Goff-Hamel on the issue
of liability.' 9
In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion offers little inde-
pendent analysis of those factors that might have driven its decision.
After admirably reviewing the facts and holdings of cases from other
jurisdictions that have faced the issue, the court simply announces it-
self to be in line with the pro-promissory estoppel crowd.20 Neverthe-
less, the court gives attention, and apparently weight, to the fact that
Goff-Hamel "relied... to her detriment" on Obstetricians' offer.2i As
13. Id. at 21-22, 588 N.W.2d at 801.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 22, 588 N.W.2d at 801.
16. See id. at 28-30, 588 N.W.2d at 804-05.
17. Id. at 22, 588 N.W.2d at 801; see Myers v. Nebraska Equal Opportunity Comm'n,
255 Neb. 156, 582 N.W.2d 362 (1998); Gillis v. City of Madison, 248 Neb. 873, 540
N.W.2d 114 (1995); Hamersky v. Nicholson Supply Co., 246 Neb. 156, 517 N.W.2d
382 (1994).
18. Goff-Hamel, 256 Neb. at 28, 588 N.W.2d at 804.
19. See id. at 29, 588 N.W.2d at 805.
20. See id. at 28, 588 N.W.2d at 804.
21. Id. at 29, 588 N.W.2d at 805.
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such, the court's language reasonably leads one to believe that it,
much like many of its pro-promissory estoppel predecessors, is most
concerned with protecting Goff-Hamel's reliance interest. Whether
such language is merely an illusory front for the underlying protection
of other values remains to be seen, and ultimately constitutes the fo-
cus of this note.
III. RELEVANT LAW
Not surprisingly, few courts have had the opportunity to ponder
the use of promissory estoppel in the at-will employment context.
However, the few courts that have weighed into the debate have been
profoundly influential in shaping many of the ideas encompassing this
topic. As such, it is important to spend a few brief moments discuss-
ing the significance of the holdings in those cases.
As the pro-promissory estoppel cases are discussed, the reader
should attempt to discern exactly what interest the court seems to be
protecting. Although preserving the injured party's "reliance interest"
is oft quoted as the vehicle for redress, do these courts really have
different motives underlying their holdings? Has protection of one's
reliance interest merely become a perfunctory, albeit widely accepted,
method for deciding cases on other grounds? Maybe.
A. Promissory Estoppel Allowed
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the seminal case of Grouse v.
Group Health Plan, Inc.,22 was the first to hold that a prospective at-
will employee had a cause of action for damages incurred in reliance
on the promise of employment.
John Grouse was a pharmacist who worked at a drugstore but de-
sired employment with a hospital or clinic. A clinic telephoned and
offered Grouse a job, which he accepted on the condition that he be
allowed to provide his current employer two weeks notice. During the
notice period, Grouse was offered another job with a hospital in Vir-
ginia, which he declined because of the clinic's offer. When Grouse
ultimately arrived for work at the clinic, he was informed that his po-
sition had been filled by someone else, due to the clinic's inability to
secure a "favorable written reference" on Grouse's behalf.23 Grouse
filed suit seeking damages under a promissory estoppel theory of
recovery.
Citing section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as au-
thority, the Supreme Court of Minnesota allowed recovery.2 4 The
court held:
22. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
23. Id. at 116.
24. See id.
204 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:199
The conclusion we reach does not imply that an employer will be liable when-
ever he discharges an employee whose term of employment is at will. What
we do hold is that under the facts of this case the appellant had a right to
assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the
satisfaction of respondent once he was on the job. He was not only denied that
opportunity but resigned the position he already held in reliance on the firm
offer which respondent tendered him. Since, as respondent points out, the
prospective employment might have been terminated at any time, the mea-
sure of damages is not so much what he would have earned from respondent
as what he lost in quitting the job he held and in declining at least one other
offer of employment elsewhere.
2 5
After Grouse, a number of courts used similar reasoning to allow
recovery based on promissory estoppel in the at-will employment con-
text.2 6 However, the court in Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,27
while still employing promissory estoppel, focused on the fulfillment of
the "employment promise" as the fulcrum of recovery. The court held:
Clearly, a contract which by its terms can be immediately terminated after it
is commenced precludes a claimant from maintaining an action upon dis-
charge after hire. This, however, does not prevent the claimant from recover-
ing damages sustained in reliance on a clear and unambiguous promise that is
broken. While, in practical effect, it may be hard to distinguish the case in
which an employee is fired a day after beginning work from the situation in
which a potential employee is prevented from assuming a promised at-will
position, the cases are different. In the former case, the employer has com-
pletely fulfilled his promise; in the latter, the promise has not been kept in
any respect. In the end, we believe this distinction sufficient to tip the balance
in favor of the burdened employee who has relied to his detriment on the un-
kept promise of his employer. Such a rule, we believe, encourages employers to
take such promises seriously.
2 8
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Relying on Grouse, the Minnesota Court of Appeals allowed recovery based on
promissory estoppel in both Gorham v. Benson Optical, 539 N.W.2d 798 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995) and Rognlien v. Carter, 443 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
Consistent with Grouse, the court in Gorham held:
We see no relevant difference between Gorham, who reported to the na-
tional sales meeting on his first day of employment, and Grouse, who
was denied even one day on the job. Both men relied to their detriment
on the promise of a new job, only to discover that the opportunity had
disintegrated before they ever actually started working. Neither man
had a "good faith opportunity to perform his duties."
Gorham, 539 N.W.2d at 801 (emphasis added) (quoting Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at
116).
The court in Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 658 P.2d 883 (Haw. 1983) also al-
lowed a prospective employee relief based on promissory estoppel. Calling detri-
mental reliance the "essence" of promissory estoppel, the court allowed a police
officer who had relied on a promise of future employment to recover when his
employment agreement was terminated prior to commencement. Ravelo, 658
P.2d at 887-88.
27. 852 F.2d 361 (8' Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 363-64 (third emphasis added).
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Finally, the court in Peck v. Imedia, Inc.,2 9 in yet another spin on
the application of promissory estoppel, has decided an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing should be read into prospective at-
will employment contracts. The court held:
We conclude that reliance on the at-will employment contract relationship
gives rise to a cause of action for damages flowing from plaintiffs losses based
on her reasonable reliance on full-time employment with defendant and her
losses based upon defendant's lack of good faith and fair dealing attributable
to any delay in expressing the decision to terminate the relationship.3 0
B. Promissory Estoppel Not Allowed
On the flip side, a number of courts have held as a matter of law
that a prospective at-will employee cannot state a claim for promis-
sory estoppel. The primary reason driving this analysis is the belief
that it is unreasonable for a prospective employee to detrimentally
rely on a promise of at-will employment. As such, since promissory
estoppel requires reasonable reliance, 31 the doctrine is inapplicable.
A recent example of this reasoning was applied in Bakotich v.
Swanson.32 In Bakotich, the court held, "'where the terminable
at[-]will doctrine is concerned, the promise for promissory estoppel
must be a clear and definite promise.'" 33 Moreover, a promise of at-
will employment does not provide a "reasonable expectation of perma-
nent employment."3 4
In White v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc.,35 the court pays
homage to the unreasonableness argument, and addresses the argua-
bly anomalous result created by permitting an employer to discharge
an at-will employee once work has begun, but not before. In disallow-
ing promissory estoppel recovery, the court stated:
[We base] this conclusion on the fact that a promise of employment for an
indefinite duration with no restrictions on the employer's right to terminate is
illusory since an employer who promises at-will employment has the right to
renege on that promise at any time for any reason. . . . The Court notes the
apparent harshness of this ruling, the result of which is that an employee who
resigns one job for other at-will employment does so at his peril. However, to
hold otherwise would create an anomalous result and would undermine the
doctrine of employment at-will in this state.3 6
29. 679 A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
30. Id. at 753 (emphasis added); see Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 90 (1981).
32. 957 P.2d 275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
33. Id. at 280 (quoting Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 876 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1994)).
34. Bakotich, 957 P.2d at 280.
35. 807 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1992).
36. Id. at 1219-20.
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Finally, the court in Meerman v. Murco, Inc.,37 required "distin-
guishing features" before removing a case from the general rule of at-
will employment. 38 Along these lines the court held, "'resignation
from one position to assume another and relocation of family would be
customary and necessary incidents of changing jobs rather than con-
sideration to support a promissory estoppel claim.'" 3 9 Consequently,
no recovery was allowed.
Based on the aforementioned foundation, both the theoretical and
pragmatic underpinnings of the Goff-Hamel case may now be ana-
lyzed. However, given the court's parse analysis in the Goff-Hamel
case, the Goff-Hamel holding itself will not be separately critiqued.
Any attempt to extrapolate the court's reasoning from words that sim-
ply are not there would no doubt be a futile exercise in outright
speculation.
Consequently, the first part of the analysis section discusses the
reasonableness of detrimentally relying on an offer of at-will employ-
ment, as well as the propriety of carving "good faith" exceptions into
the at-will doctrine. The second part of the analysis section rejects
both approaches and instead suggests that alternative, non-reliance
based concepts of promissory estoppel offer more logical methods of
softening the harshness of the at-will doctrine.
IV. ANALYSIS
In 1985, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the rule of law
stated in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.4 0 That
rule, popularly known as the doctrine of promissory estoppel, reads as
follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does in-
duce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.4 1
Accordingly, when taken at face value the doctrine appears to
center around a determination of whether the promisor should reason-
37. 517 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
38. Id. at 834 (citing Filcek v. Norris-Schmid, Inc., 401 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); Hackett v. Foodmaker, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 140, 141 (Mich. Ct. App.
1976)).
39. Meerman, 517 N.W.2d at 834-35 (quoting Marrero v. McDonnell Douglas Capital
Corp., 505 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)).
40. See Yankton Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430 (1985).
Prior to the adoption of section 90, the Nebraska Supreme Court informally ap-
plied similar reasoning in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Farmland Serv.
Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976); Leach v. Treber, 164
Neb. 419, 82 N.W.2d 544 (1957).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (emphasis added).
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ably expect his or her promise to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee. However, most courts and commentators in-
stead turn the analysis on its head and discuss the reasonableness of
the promisee's reliance on the promisor's promise.42 This simply
makes the doctrine less difficult to understand since, by most ac-
counts, evaluating the reasonableness of the promisee's reaction to a
promise is easier than judging the reasonableness of the promisor's
state-of-mind in making the promise. Moreover, analyzing the doc-
trine in the reverse does not compromise the theoretical purity of the
discussion since the reasonableness of the situation does not, or at
least should not, hinge upon which side of the equation is being ana-
lyzed. Consequently, for convenience sake, this note will follow the
common trend and analyze the situation from the promisee's
perspective.
That being said, the million dollar question seems to be "Can a pro-
spective employee reasonably rely on an offer of at-will employment?"
The answer, contrary to the desires of the Nebraska Supreme Court,
is no.
A. The At-Will Employment Doctrine and the
Reasonableness of Reliance
The general rule of at-will employment states that, "when the em-
ployment is not for a definite term, and there are no contractual or
statutory restrictions upon the right of discharge, an employer may
lawfully discharge an employee whenever and for whatever cause it
chooses without incurring liability."43 Affording these words their
plain meaning, how could any prospective employee reasonably rely
on an offer of at-will employment; an offer that, by its very definition,
denounces any semblance of continuity and stability? The answer, of
course, is they cannot.
Nevertheless, for reasons which continue to defy logic, a number of
courts seem beholden to the idea that the reasonableness of reliance is
somehow directly proportional to the distance the promisee travels. 44
For example, in Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & C0.45 the court noted,
"implicit in... an [at-will] employment agreement ... is the under-
standing that an employer cannot expect a new employee to sever his
employment and move across the country only to be terminated before
42. See, e.g., Gerald Griffin Reidy, Definite and Substantial Reliance: Remedying In-
justice Under Section 90, 67 FORDHAMI L. RE;v. 1217 (1998).
43. Renner v. Wurdeman, 231 Neb. 8, 14, 434 N.W.2d 536, 541 (1989).
44. Two examples of a court employing this philosophy can be found in Peck v.
Imedia, Inc., 679 A.2d 745, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) and Sheppard v.
Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1990).
45. 266 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1990).
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the ink dries on his new lease ... "46 But do not these courts have it
exactly backwards? Is not the reasonableness of reliance inversely
proportional to the distance one must travel? A reasonable person
might feel comfortable quitting their current job and moving, say,
down the street in reliance on an offer of at-will employment. If the
offer is reneged, the employee is still only a few blocks from home. But
only a fool would pack up his family and move half way across the
country in reliance on an offer that is about as stable as the San An-
dreas Fault line. Such thinking is simply not rational and should not
be encouraged, much less rewarded.
Even further, a number of courts implicitly hold that an employee
should always be justified in relying on the "good word" of a soliciting
employer. Operating on gentlemanly principles, these courts seem to
suggest that an employer's words always have an underlying "good
will" component, but these courts are mistaken.
The words that create an employer's offer of employment must be
taken at face value. They should never be interpreted to connote a
message greater than their literal meaning, nor should they take on
greater value simply because an employer, as opposed to any other
person, said them. Translated, this simply means that the speaker
should not influence the message; the message should speak for itself.
For example, if the Pope were to say, "Goff-Hamel, I would like to
offer you a job painting the ceiling of the Vatican, but I can fire you
whenever I please," his goodwill should not overshadow his ability to
fire her. The Pope is a nice guy, but not that nice. Moreover, if the
Pope does fire her, he would still be a man of his word. Why? Because
he was true to his statement; the fact that his statement contained an
automatic means of dismissal does not make him dishonorable. In
short, his good nature does not create an implicit promise that extends
beyond his words.
Accordingly, an employee may reasonably rely on the "word" of an
employer, insofar as that means the employer is estopped from chang-
ing the terms of the offer midstream (the "you cannot take it back"
defense, so to speak). But, the employee's reliance becomes unreason-
able when the words of the offeror are, "You can have the job, but I can
fire you at any moment!" and the offeree interprets them to mean,
"Yeah, I have a job until I do something wrong!" At this point, the
"word" or "good will" of the employer is not being used to hold the
employer to the expressions of his promise, but to create an offer that
was never there. Such constructs are not only officious, but more im-
portantly, unreasonable.
Consequently, from any logical point of view, reliance is simply
misplaced in the at-will employment context. Many prospective at-
46. Id. at 787.
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will employees can say they relied, but few with a straight face can say
they did so reasonably. As such, their reliance is simply not sufficient
to properly invoke the section 90 variety of promissory estoppel.
B. Avoiding Reality: Attempts to Read "Good Faith" and
"Fair Dealing" Exceptions into the At-Will
Employment Doctrine
Understanding that reasonable reliance is but a judicial fallacy
with respect to at-will employment, a few courts have intuitively at-
tempted to circumvent the harsh realities of the situation another
way-this time by reading "good faith" or "fair dealing" exceptions
into the at-will doctrine.4 7 (Un)fortunately, the effect of such provi-
sions does not merely carve a pigeonhole into the general strictures of
at-will employment, but rather completely eviscerates its purpose.
Requiring employers to act in good faith when making employment
decisions is no more than a thinly veiled judicial dictate that masters
show "cause" before lawfully discharging their servants. Such "for
cause" constructions of the at-will doctrine are a complete betrayal of
its very spirit.
Again, the reasoning of Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan Co.48 is illus-
trative. In Sheppard, the court noted:
[Ilmplicit in ... an [at-will] employment agreement, and certainly implicit
within the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, is the understand-
ing that an employer cannot expect a new employee to sever his former em-
ployment and move across the country .. . before he has had a chance to
demonstrate his ability to satisfy the requirements of the job.4 9
Such holdings are not only doctrinally impure, they are, more directly,
patently false. For better or worse, the annals of the at-will employ-
ment doctrine are utterly devoid of any semblance of an "implicit" re-
quirement that an employee must demonstrably fail to satisfy the
requirements of his or her employment before he or she may be law-
fully discharged.50 More to the point, requiring an employer to show
an employee's inability to perform the requirements of the job before
47. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
48. 266 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1990).
49. Id. at 787.
50. See WOOD, supra note 5, § 134. In his treatise, Wood stated:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefi-
nite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve... [Unless
their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a cer-
tain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determina-
ble at the will of either party.
Id. § 134, at 272.
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allowing lawful discharge sounds precariously similar to the substan-
tive prerequisites inherent in dismissal "for cause."
Furthermore, beyond merely sounding like "for cause" discharge,
the above quoted language suffers from serious application problems.
For example, when does the "chance" to satisfy the job requirements
end so that discharge is viable? One week? One month? One year
into the job? Even more importantly, if the employee is satisfying the
requirements of the job, may he or she ever be discharged? If not, the
at-will employment doctrine has been defeated altogether. Thus, im-
plied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, much like reliance-
based promissory estoppel, are simply untenable "exceptions" to the
at-will doctrine.
C. Recognizing Reality: Alternative Applications of the
Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
If reliance-based promissory estoppel is unreasonable in the at-will
employment context, and implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing are illogical with respect to the same, why do an increasing
number of courts continue to endorse their application in cases involv-
ing prospective at-will employees? The answer is simple: courts de-
spise the harshness of the at-will doctrine and, as a consequence, will
do anything to limit its severity. Such determination includes, among
other things, a complete disregard for the traditional, theoretical, and
practical applications of promissory estoppel and other equitable
remedies.
The problem is that these courts cannot find anything that resem-
bles reasonable reliance. So, instead of simply giving up, they, in a
poor interpretive move, fudge the reliance requirement, attempt to
write opinions confusing enough to make even Cardozo jealous, and
ultimately hide the ball. Unfortunately, such an approach entirely
muddles the meaning of reliance-based promissory estoppel, and also
fails to provide any discernible exception to the at-will doctrine, if in-
deed that is their goal.
So, as simple as it may seem, a better approach would be to simply
tell the truth. The Nebraska Supreme Court might hold, "We cannot
find reliance here, but we think you are a real scoundrel for withdraw-
ing your offer to employ Goff-Hamel, so you are liable for damages.
And further more, as a warning to other employers in Nebraska, if you
make an offer of employment in furtherance of your own economic ac-
tivity,51 or take advantage of your position, information, and expertise
to the detriment of others, such promises will also be enforced, 52 re-
gardless of the promisee's lack of reliance."
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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Yes, if a court were to be honest and do that, a number of things
would seem to be accomplished. First, by being up-front, lower courts
and current and future litigants would be able to understand and fully
appreciate the rules of the game being played. Second, the doctrinal
purity of section 90 would not be confusingly stretched beyond any
form of recognition, additional versions of promissory estoppel would
simply be available. By naming and officially recognizing these ver-
sions, the Nebraska Supreme Court could accomplish the exact same
results without compromising the legitimacy of the judiciary. Such
goals are, without a doubt, worthwhile.
Critics of this approach, while appreciating its simplicity, might
suggest that it still fails to release the system from arbitrary, ad hoc
judicial overreaching. They might suggest that an activist court, in-
stead of simply stretching section 90 to fit its needs, will now just add
a new version of promissory estoppel to accomplish the same. In fact,
they might argue that the ability to dream up completely new versions
of promissory estoppel makes the courts even more dangerous.
However, this argument is incorrect. No process will ever force a
court into rubber-stamp objectivity, nor should it. Some of this coun-
try's greatest decisions have been products of subjective judicial over-
reaching.53 Nevertheless, with respect to section 90 and at-will
employment, much of the subjectivity has come from strained at-
tempts to find reasonable reliance. If other avenues were available,
avenues with which a court could reach the results they desire and yet
be up front with their reasoning, much of the subjectivity would likely
subside. Furthermore, as courts honestly decide cases and place them
into certain categories the rule of stare decisis should further cabin
subjectivity. So, over time, subjective judicial analysis will actually
decrease instead of rise.
No court prefers smoke-and-mirrors over honest disclosure. At the
same time, no court prefers an unnecessarily harsh result when a
more mild one is available. Therefore, if a court can avoid engaging in
deception to accomplish an equitable result, the system should operate
more smoothly. The proposed process is not flawless, but it seems to
be an improvement over the methods of old.
D. Adopting an Approach: A Starting Point
That being said, there are two alternative approaches that seem
especially viable in the at-will employment context: the "in further-
53. Many of the substantive due process cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court have been subjective, at best. Without express textual support from the
constitution, protection of an individual's personal liberty and right to privacy
were upheld in cases like Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstad v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ance of economic activity" theory propounded by Professors Farber
and Matheson54 and the "deserving promise" theory proposed by Pro-
fessor Juliet Kostritsky.55
Most directly, Farber and Matheson propose revising section 71 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to read: "A promise is enforcea-
ble when made in furtherance of an economic activity."56 "Economic
activity," according to the authors, includes "employment arrange-
ments" 57 and the words "in furtherance" "carr[y] the implication that
the promisor must expect a benefit to result from the promise."5 8
Their proposal is both interesting and significant for a number of
reasons. First, and most notably, the authors decided to rewrite the
Restatement's consideration provision, section 71,59 instead of
reinventing section 90. By doing so, the authors ingeniously attack
the problem in the reverse. Many potential contracts end up as prom-
issory estoppel claims simply because they lack one of the currently
recognized forms of consideration. Therefore, by broadening the con-
sideration requirement and moving away from strict "bargain theory,"
many previously unenforceable contracts instantly become valid.
Voila!
Farber and Matheson chose this approach after studying over two
hundred promissory estoppel cases. They concluded that "detrimental
reliance had veered far from its traditional meaning"60 and that
courts were enforcing promises for their own sake, "rather than be-
cause 'justice' so require[d] .... "61 They believed that courts, regard-
less of reliance, were most prone to allow recovery when three factors
were present: "(1) the presence of a credible promise; (2) the promisor's
authority to make the promise; and (3) the existence of a benefit to the
promisor from economic activity."62 Without saying more, this ap-
proach makes objective sense in the at-will employment context, and
thus seems a viable solution to the problem.
Finally, there is Professor Kostritsky's argument. She "advances
the thesis that promissory estoppel can best be understood, not as a
ground of recovery independent of bargain-enforcement, but rather as
a subsidiary means of identifying bargains deserving of enforce-
ment."6 3 After extensive analysis of a number of decided cases, Kos-
54. See Farber and Matheson, supra note 9.
55. See Kostritsky, supra note 10.
56. Farber & Matheson, supra note 9, at 929.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 931.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
60. Farber & Matheson, supra note 9, at 912.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 914.
63. Knapp, supra note 3, at 1211 (discussing Kostritsky, supra note 10).
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tritsky suggests that courts most often allow promissory estoppel in
the following situations:
(1) cases where the parties are of different status, or for other reasons have
different degrees of knowledge about the subject of their dealings; (2) cases
involving parties who are already "enmeshed" in some broader relationship;
and (3) cases where a relationship of trust and confidence already exists be-
tween the parties.6 4
Therefore, Kostritsky believes that courts are actively engaged in
policing transactional situations where contracts fail due to a lack of
knowledge, status, information, and expertise between the parties.6 5
Conversely, if parties operate at arms-length, with sufficient amounts
of expertise, and/or with equal bargaining power a court is not likely
to tamper with the results of their exchange.6 6 Given the inequality
in bargaining power and information between at-will employers and
their prospective employees, Kostritsky's analysis also makes sense in
the at-will employment context.
The list could go on, for there are many others with similar ideas.
Nevertheless, the point is simple: if a court is interested in mitigating
the harsh results of the at-will doctrine, there are logical ways to ac-
complish that goal. It may be high time that at-will employment be
scrapped altogether, but until that day Farber, Matheson, and Kos-
tritsky's approaches, among others, provide viable, logical in-
termediaries. They should be given serious consideration by the
Nebraska Supreme Court in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 90 is a wonderful tool for alleviating or preventing undue
harm to a promisee who has reasonably relied to his or her detriment.
However, when a promisee lacks reasonable reliance sufficient to al-
low recovery under section 90, it is time for another rule of law to take
over and mitigate the potentially harsh results. In the at-will employ-
ment context that time has come.
There are numerous alternative approaches available for dealing
with the situation, each one unique in its concept and effect. The
point is not to painstakingly attempt to decide which approach is best
and then apply that one method universally across the board, but
rather to have each court find which alternatives fit most appropri-
ately in its state and apply them accordingly. Only then will the
proper balance between the at-will doctrine and its employees be
struck.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1211-1212.
66. See id.
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